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CONSUMER PROTECTION - THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND THE INSURANCE CODE: DOES PER SE
NECESSARILY PREEMPT? - Pearce v. American Defender
Life Ins. Co.
INTRODUCTION

In North Carolina, the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA)
grants to any person injured by an unfair or deceptive act in or
affecting commerce the right to a civil action against a person,
firm, or corporation for treble damages.1 The Insurance Code2 regulates the business of insurance in North Carolina and contains a
section entitled "Unfair Trade Practices Act."' The judiciary must
reconcile the two statutes to determine what role the regulatory
section of the Insurance Code plays in a private action under the
more general UTPA.
In an effort to increase consumer protection for insurance buyers, the North Carolina Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Pearce v.
American Defender Life Ins. Co. 4 held that any violation of the

Insurance Code section defining unfair trade practices was, "as a
matter of law," an unfair trade practice for which a consumer
could bring a civil action for treble damages. 5 The Pearce decision,
however, left some significant unanswered questions. The court did
not state whether a regulatory violation creates a per se unfair
trade practice under the UTPA. Nor did the court address whether
the regulatory statute preempts the UTPA in defining an unfair
insurance practice in a civil action. Despite the supreme court's intent to protect insurance consumers, its decision in Pearce ultimately may restrict both the consumer's ability to recover for an
unfair trade practice injury and the regulatory agency's ability to
effectively regulate the insurance industry.
This Note will address two main issues. The first issue is
whether a violation of the Insurance Code regulatory section entitled "Unfair Trade Practices" should be a per se unfair trade practice under the UTPA. The second is whether the Insurance Code
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1 - 16.2 (1987).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. Chap. 58 (1982 and Supp. 1987).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.1 - 54.13 (1982 and Supp. 1987).
4. 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986).
5. Id. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179.
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preempts the UTPA in defining unfair insurance practices.
The first issue presents itself when an insurance company violates one of the Insurance Code's unfair practices regulations. Is
the insurer then per se subject to treble damages in a private civil
action under the UTPA? Should the company be forced to pay
treble damages for an activity that once resulted in only a cease
and desist order or fine? Does the insurance company have any
recourse at trial if the violation is now a per se unfair trade
practice?
The second issue arises when a consumer is injured by an insurance practice not listed in the Insurance Code. Is the buyer precluded from recovering for an unfair practice unless he can prove a
violation of the Insurance Code? Are consumers better protected
by case-by-case determinations of unfairness or by legislative mandates? How should plaintiffs' attorneys plead and attempt to prove
such cases? Although Pearce enhanced consumer protection for insurance buyers, questions of policy dictate that the judiciary or
legislature clarify the decision to serve the purposes of both the
UTPA and the Insurance Code.
THE CASE

In Pearce, the plaintiff, a young widow, sued American Defender Life Insurance Company (American Defender) for refusing
to pay death benefits to her under her deceased husband's accidental life insurance policy.' In 1961, when the decedent, Mr. Pearce,
was still a college student, he purchased a $20,000.00 life insurance
policy from American Defender.' At the same time, Mr. Pearce
purchased an accidental death rider, with benefits of $40,000.00,
naming Mrs. Pearce as the beneficiary.$ The accidental death rider
contained a "flight exception." 9 The clause released American Defender from any obligation to pay the benefits of the policy if Mr.
Pearce died in an aircraft accident that occurred while he was a
crew member or that was flown for military purposes. 0
In 1971, Mr. Pearce entered the United States Air Force." He
wrote to American Defender to confirm his coverage under the two
6. Id. at 465, 343 S.E.2d at 176.
7. Id. at 463, 343 S.E.2d at 176.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 463-64, 343 S.E.2d at 176.
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policies. 12 The dispute in the case arose as a result of the reply Mr.
Pearce received from American Defender. 3 In the letter, American
Defender stated that, "in addition to the basic policy, . . . this Accidental Death Rider would also be payable should [Mr. Pearce's]
death occur while in the Armed Forces but not as the result of
war."" Six weeks later, Mr. Pearce was killed in a military aircraft
exercise off the coast of England. 5 Although Mr. Pearce's death
was not the result of war, American Defender refused to pay the
accidental death benefits. 6
Mrs. Pearce brought this action alleging nine claims for relief,
including fraud and unfair trade practices.' 7 The unfair trade practices claim was based on the UTPA section 75-1.1 and the Insurance Code section 58-54.4.11 The pertinent Insurance Code subsection provides:
The following are hereby defined as unfair . . . acts in the business of insurance: (1) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of
Policy Contracts - Making, issuing, circulating ... any estimate,
illustration, circular or statement misrepresenting the terms of
any policy issued .... 19
The trial court initially granted American Defender's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim on all nine counts.2 0 The appeals
court, limiting its holding to the propriety of granting the motion
to dismiss, remanded the case for further proceedings.2 1 At trial in
1984, the court entered a directed verdict for American Defender
on the fraud and unfair trade practices claims. The jury awarded
Mrs. Pearce $40,000.00 in accidental death benefits on the contract, but the judge entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendant. Mrs. Pearce appealed the trial court's
2
directed verdict on the fraud and unfair trade practices claims.
12. Id. at 463, 343 S.E.2d at 176.
13. Id. at 464, 343 S.E.2d at 176.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 465, 343 S.E.2d at 177.
16. Id.
17. Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 661, 662, 303
S.E.2d 608, 608 (1983), appeal after remand, 74 N.C. App. 620, 330 S.E.2d 9
(1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986).
18. Pearce, 74 N.C. App. at 628, 330 S.E.2d at 14.
19. Id. at 629, 330 S.E.2d at 14-15.
20. Id. at 624, 330 S.E.2d at 12.
21. Pearce, 62 N.C. App. at 668, 303 S.E.2d at 612.
22. Pearce, 74 N.C. App. at 624, 330 S.E.2d at 12.
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The court of appeals then focused on the unfair trade practices
claim. The court directed its analysis of the claim to the UTPA
section 75-1.1.23 Relying on prior judicial interpretations of section
75-1.1, the appeals court concluded that the reply letter from
American Defender to Mr. Pearce was not, in these circumstances,
an unfair act.2" The supreme court reversed, holding that any violation of the Insurance Code section 58-54.4, including the subsection cited by Mrs. Pearce, was as a matter of law an unfair trade
practice under the UTPA section 75-1.1.25
BACKGROUND

Private litigation based on unfair trade practices of insurance
companies is a relatively recent development in North Carolina.26
In pleading these private actions for their clients, attorneys traditionally base their claims on violations of the regulatory statutes of
the Insurance Code rather than on the UTPA alone.2 This section
of the Note will outline the UTPA and the Insurance Code "Unfair
Trade Practices Act" and define the concept of per se as it relates
to this area of law.
A.

The Unfair Trade Practices Act

North Carolina's consumer protection statute is known as the
Unfair Trade Practices Act.2 8 The UTPA entitles plaintiffs to recover treble damages for an injury caused by an "unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce. ' 29 The four elements necessary
23. Id. at 628, 330 S.E.2d at 14.

24. Id. at 629, 330 S.E.2d at 15. See Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980). An unfair act includes an act that has the
capacity or tendency to deceive the average consumer. The court specifically held
that American Defender's representations were not "deceptive" to the average
consumer. Id. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
25. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179. The court reversed the directed verdict in favor of defendant. Id. at 472-73, 343 S.E.2d at 180.
26. Ray v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
Ray was the first North Carolina case to reconcile the UTPA with the Insurance
Code. The court held that the insurance industry was not exempt from the
UTPA. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E.2d
271 (1980). See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
28. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§ 75-1.1 - 16.2.

29. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16. (The statute refers to unfair acts and
practices. For purposes of this Note, unfair acts and practices will be referred to
as either unfair acts or unfair practices.)
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for relief are: an unfair act; an actual injury; proximate cause; and
commerce. 0 Although the statute does not define an "unfair act,"
the courts have interpreted an "unfair act" to be any act that offends established public policy or that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers."1
An "unfair act" also includes any act that has the capacity or tendency to deceive the average consumer.32 Section 75-16 enforces
the prohibition against unfair acts by giving an injured consumer a
private right of action.-3 To encourage private enforcement, sections 75-16 and 75-16.1 entitle a successful plaintiff to recover
treble damages and attorney fees. 4
B.

The Insurance Code Unfair Trade Practices Act

The Insurance Code contains a section entitled "Unfair Trade
Practices Act." 5 This statute prohibits any activities defined in
the statute to be an unfair act in the business of insurance. 6 Section 58-54.4 specifies a list of thirteen unfair acts that includes
misrepresentations, false advertising of insurance policies, and unfair claim settlement practices.3 7 The statute authorizes the Insurance Commissioner to institute administrative proceedings against
any insurer whom he has reason to believe has engaged in or is
engaging in any unfair act as defined in the regulations.3 The
Commissioner may hold a hearing on the charges and may serve a
cease and desist notice or order the payment of a penalty for a
violation.3 9 However, the statute neither explicitly nor implicitly
30. Id. As an essential element of plaintiff's cause of action, plaintiff must
prove not only a violation of § 75-1.1 but also actual injury as a proximate cause
of the activity alleged. Ellis, 48 N.C. App at 184, 268 S.E.2d at 273-74.
31. Johnson, 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610. See also Marshall v. Miller, 302
N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
32. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16 - 16.1.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.1 - 54.13.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4 defines thirteen unfair acts. Pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.9, the Insurance Commissioner may
also make determinations of unfair acts not otherwise listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
58-54.4. (The statute refers to unfair acts and practices. For purposes of this
Note, unfair acts and practices will be referred to as either unfair acts or unfair
practices.)
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.5 - 54.6.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.6 - 54.7 and 58-54.11.
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authorizes the Commissioner to award damages to an aggrieved
person or to determine a right to a private action for damages.
C. Per Se Defined
Generally, a violation per se exists when the evidence proves
that a particular activity occurred and the law provides no possible
justification for that activity. 0 North Carolina has not yet articulated a test for a per se unfair trade practice, " but other states
define a per se unfair trade practice as an act that is both illegal
and against public policy. 2 Therefore, the test for per se status is
twofold: first, whether the action is illegal, and, second, whether it
is against public policy as declared by the legislature or the
judiciary."3
Although North Carolina courts have not defined a specific
test for per se unfair trade acts, they customarily look to the public policy implications in determining whether a particular activity
constitutes an unfair trade practice."" Insurance Code violations
are illegal, but they may not always contravene the policy of the
UTPA. Pearce held that violations of the Code's unfair practices
section are, "as a matter of law," unfair trade practices under the
UTPA, but it did not term such activities "per se" violations."
The question, then, is whether the Pearce court in fact intended to
create a per se rule for Insurance Code violations.
In North Carolina, traditionally a judge determined whether a
trade practice was unfair, that is, whether the action was against
public policy or was immoral, unethical, oppressive, or substantially injurious to consumers,' based on the facts in each case and
on the impact of the practice on the marketplace.'7 The North
40. Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace - The Role of the
North Carolina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection,6 WAKE
FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1969).
41. But cf. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521
(1973). In Rose, the supreme court addressed unfair methods of competition and
held that an activity was a per se unfair method of competition violative of the
Sherman Act if the activity was incapable of any legal or economic justification.
42. See, e.g., Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d
1349 (1978).
43. Salois, 581 P.2d at 1350-51.
44. See, e.g., Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
45. Id.
46. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179.
47. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 262-63, 266 S.E.2d at 620.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/5
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Carolina Supreme Court in Hardy v. Toler 4'8 held that although the
role of the jury is that of a factfinder, the court determines
whether the facts, in light of the circumstances of each case, constitute an unfair practice."9 Therefore, prior to Pearce, the trial
judge in each case determined as a matter of law whether an unfair
practice occurred.
The trial judge, however, does not always have to determine
whether an act is unfair in a particular case. Some North Carolina
regulatory statutes contain specific provisions providing that a violation of the regulation automatically constitutes an unfair trade
practice under the UTPA.50 These provisions are legislative determinations that the illegal activities designated in the statutes violate the policy of the UTPA. The legislative mandates therefore
expressly elevate the activities regulated by these statutes to per se
violations of the UTPA. Other states have provisions in their regulatory statutes similar to those in the North Carolina statutes."
Perhaps the most sweeping per se rule for unfair practices is a California statute providing that any violation of state law in a business context is a per se violation of California's unfair trade practices act.5 2
In 1980, the North Carolina Court of Appeals first recognized
that some regulatory violations may warrant per se treatment even
though the regulatory statute does not specifically refer to the
UTPA.53 The North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently
adopted this position in 1985." While Pearce was pending appeal
to the supreme court, the court decided Winston Realty Co. v.
48. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342(1975).
49. Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
50. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me.
1981) (a violation of the Maine Uniform Commercial Code constitutes a per se
violation of the UTPA); Salois, 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978) (discussing
a violation of the state statutes regulating collection agencies as a per se violation
of the UTPA).
52. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1984).
53. State v. Zim Chemicals Co., Inc., 45 N.C. App. 604, 263 S.E.2d 849 (1980)
(holding that a violation of a statute regulating the branding of antifreeze was, as
a matter of law, an unfair trade practice).
54. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985),
aff'g, 70 N.C. App. 374, 320 S.E.2d 286 (1984) (holding a violation of a regulation
governing private personnel agencies was, as a matter of law, a violation of the
UTPA).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 5
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:487

G.H.G., Inc.5 5 Winston Realty created a per se rule for violations
of the regulations governing private personnel agencies. 5" The
Pearce court then relied heavily on its decision in Winston Realty
to conclude that any Insurance Code unfair practices violation was,
as a matter of law, an unfair act under the UTPA 7
D. The UTPA and the Business of Insurance
The Western District Court of North Carolina opened the
door to private consumer litigation for unfair trade practices of insurance companies in Ray v. United Family Life Ins. Co..5 Even
though the Insurance Code provides a mechanism for the administrative regulation of unfair -insurance practices, the court allowed
the plaintiff to recover under UTPA section 75-1.1. 5 ' The Ray

court emphasized that the Insurance Code had no provision for
civil damage actions.8 0 It concluded that the source of the UTPA's
private right of action, section 75-16, was the vehicle for individual
consumer redress against insurers."
The North Carolina Court of Appeals followed Ray in Ellis v.
Smith-Broadhurst,Inc. 2 The plaintiff in Ellis alleged that misrepresentations by his insurance company violated the Insurance Code
section 58-54.4 defining unfair insurance practices. 3 He contended
further that misconduct prohibited by the Insurance Code could
be the basis of recovery pursuant to the UTPA section 75-1.1.1'
Without considering the role of section 58-54.4 of the Insurance
Code, the court held that the UTPA provides a remedy for unfair
55. 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985). The court held that two subsections
of the section entitled "Prohibited Acts" in regulatory statutes governing private
personnel agencies were unfair "as a matter of law." Id. at 91-92, 331 S.E.2d at
678.
56. Id. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681.
57. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179.
58. 430 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
59. Id. at 1356.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1356-57.
62. 48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E.2d 271 (1980) (unfair acts in the insurance
industry are not regulated exclusively by the insurance statutes). The Insurance
Code § 58-54.8(d) provides: "No order of the Commissioner ... shall in any way
relieve or absolve any person ...

from any liability under any other laws of this

State."
63. Id. at 181, 268 S.E.2d at 272.
64. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/5

8

A.

19881Heenan: Consumer
CONSUMER
PROTECTION
THE
UTPA
495
Protection
- The UnfairAND
Trade
Practices
Act and the Insu
insurance practices 6 by creating a private right of action against
insurers under section 75-1.1.6a
The appeals court in Phillips v. Integon Corp.,6 7 subsequently
reiterated that the Insurance Code was not the exclusive vehicle
for obtaining relief from those who engage in unfair trade practices
in the insurance industry.6 8 Yet, until Pearce, no North Carolina
court explained the specific effect of the Insurance Code definitions of unfair practices on consumers and insurers in civil suits for
treble damages.
ANALYSIS

The Insurance Code section 58-54.4 lists thirteen activities for
which the Insurance Commissioner may issue cease and desist orders or fines.6 9 The evolution in the law from Ray to Pearce allows
a private citizen to bring suit against an insurance company for
these regulatory violations. The Pearce ruling creates the question
of whether a violation of this regulatory section will now be elevated to the determining factor in a private claim based on unfair
insurance practices. This raises a very important issue because an
unfair trade practice in a civil suit under the UTPA warrants
treble damages whereas a violation of the regulatory code results in
only injunctions or fines. Pearce held that a violation of section 5854.4 was, as a matter of law, an unfair trade practice within the
meaning of section 75-1.1.7 0 The two specific issues Pearce raises
are, first, whether proof of a violation of the Insurance Code section 58-54.4 is conclusive proof of an unfair act in a private action
and, second, whether proof of such a violation is necessary to sus.tain a private cause of action.
65. Id. at 183, 268 S.E.2d at 272.
66. Id. at 183-84, 268 S.E.2d at 273-74.
67. 70 N.C. App. 440, 319 S.E.2d 673 (1984).
68. Id. at 443, 319 S.E.2d at 675. In Phillips, the court reconciled N.C. GEN.
Chap. 58 with N.C. GEN. STAT. Chap. 75 in a claim against an insurer for
unfair methods of competition.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4. The thirteen activities are: (1) misrepresentaSTAT.

tions and false advertising of policy contracts; (2) false information and advertising generally; (3) defamation; (4) boycott, coercion, and intimidation; (5) false financial statements; (6) stock operations and insurance company advisory board
contracts; (7) unfair discrimination; (8) rebates; (9) advertising of health, accident, or hospitalization insurance; (10) soliciting, etc., unauthorized insurance
contracts in other states; (11) unfair claim settlement practices; (12) misuse of
borrowers' confidential information; and (13) overinsurance in credit or loan

transactions.
70. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179.
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Pearce's Per Se Rule

The Code forbids insurance companies from engaging in misrepresentation, false advertising, defamation, coercion, discrimination, presentation of false financial statements, and unfair settlement practices. 7 1 The court in Pearce could have resolved the
narrow issue of whether American Defender's action was unfair by
holding that a violation of subsection one of section 58-54.4 constitutes an unfair or deceptive act under the broad UTPA standard.
The court instead made the sweeping holding that any of the thirteen activities listed in section 58-54.4 constitutes an unfair trade
'72
practice under the UTPA "as a matter of law."
The Pearce court apparently examined all the activities listed
in the Code section 58-54.4 and determined that each met the judicially promulgated tests for unfairness under the UTPA. According
to Pearce, proof of any violation of section 58-54.4 satisfies unconditionally the first of the four elements required for a UTPA private action, an unfair act. Since a per se violation exists when the
evidence proves that a particular activity occurred, the Pearce
holding then seems to say that a violation of section 58-54.4 constitutes a per se unfair act under the UTPA.
1. Reliance on Winston Realty
In Pearce, the supreme court relied heavily on its recent decision in Winston Realty.73 In Winston Realty, the court held that
certain statutes regulating private personnel agencies were, as a
matter of law, unfair trade practices under the UTPA. 74 At the appellate court level, a strong dissent urged that, although there may
be instances in which a violation of the regulatory statute supports
a finding of an unfair practice in violation of section 75-1.1, the
regulatory violation should not be the exclusive determining factor. 5 The Pearce decision invites the criticism that finding that an
insurer violated a regulation does not necessarily resolve the issue
71. Id.
72. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179.
73. Id. at 469, 343 S.E.2d at 179. Winston Realty was decided while Pearce
was on appeal to the supreme court from the appellate court.
74. Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681. The regulatory statute
referred to in Winston Realty governing private personnel agencies is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-47.6, entitled "Prohibited Acts."
75. Winston Realty, 70 N.C. App. at 382, 320 S.E.2d at 291 (Hedrick, J.,
dissenting).
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of whether the act was unfair to the plaintiff. Significantly, the supreme court in Winston Realty confined its decision to the particular subsections presented to the court in the complaint rather
than encompassing the entire regulatory section. In contrast, the
Pearce decision applied to section 58-54.4 in its entirety, even
though the complaint alleged a violation of only one of the thirteen
subsections.
2.

The Court's Role In Determining Unfairness

If Pearce constitutes a per se rule for section 75-1.1, the rule
seems contrary to the traditional case law requirement that a trial
judge determines the unfairness of an act in light of the circumstances of a particular case. 76 The Pearce holding requires the trial
judge to find a section 75-1.1 unfair act as a matter of law once a
jury determines that the insurance company violated section 5854.4. The Pearce decision did not change the jury's traditional
duty of factfinder, but it dramatically impacted the consequences
of the jury's factual findings. The true effect of Pearce is that the
legislature, and not the trial judge, is now the ultimate determiner
of unfairness.
Many of the Code's proscribed activities are mechanical in nature and require only a determination of whether or not a specific
action took place. For example, section 58-54.4(10) prohibits an insurer from soliciting, advertising, or entering into insurance contracts in states in which it is not licensed. 7 A jury can objectively
find as a matter of fact that an insurer advertised in a state in
which it was not licensed. Other provisions require more subjective
determinations, such as an insurer's state of mind or the effect of
an act on the consumer. Section 58-54.4(1) forbids an insurer from
making misleading statements to induce a policyholder to surrender his insurance. 78 In a case like this, the jury must determine
subjective elements such as deceit or intent, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Traditionally, once the jury found as a fact that one of these activities
occurred, the court then exercised its authority to decide whether
the activity was unfair.79 With Pearce, the court merely relinquished to the legislature the judiciary's traditional role as the de76.
77.
78.
79.

Hardy, 288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(10).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(1).
Hardy, 288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346.
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terminer of unfairness. Now, when a jury finds as a fact that an
insurer performed an act proscribed by the Code, that act automatically constitutes an unfair act under the UTPA. The insurer
then will be subject to treble damages provided the consumer
proves injury and proximate cause.
3. Legislative Action and Inaction
The most persuasive argument against the appropriateness of
a judicially created per se rule for a Code violation is that the legislature did not specify it as such. In other regulatory areas, the
legislature clearly stated its intent that a violation of a regulatory
code provision simultaneously constitutes a violation of the UTPA
section 75-1.1.8 0 For example, the last subsection of the Business
Opportunity Sales Act states that "any violation of the provisions
of this article shall constitute an unfair trade practice under G.S.
75-1.1."'81 Similar provisions appear in the Loan Broker's Statute, 2
the Prepared Entertainment Contracts Statute, 3 and the Debt
84
Collection Policies Act.
Even so, North Carolina courts ruled in two prior cases 85 that
violations of particular regulatory statutes are violations of section
75-1.1 even though the legislature did not specifically provide for
such in the regulatory statute.8 Moreover, the response of the legislature to the Pearce decision indicates that it approves of the
87
Pearce per se rule. In State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penny Co.,
the supreme court advised that if it had not properly interpreted
section 75-1.1 the General Assembly could amend the statute.8
The Pearce decision recognized private claims based on violations
of any of the thirteen regulatory prohibitions contained in section
58-54.4 of the Insurance Code. The legislature subsequently
amended the Code89 by adding a proviso to subsection eleven of
80. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-100(e) (1987).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-111(d) (1987).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-125(c) (1987).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-52 (1987).
85. See Winston Realty, 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677; Zim Chemicals, 45
N.C. App. 604, 263 S.E.2d 849 (1980).
86. See generally Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981)
(discussing the UTPA and the Retail Sales Act).
87. 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
88. Id. at 320, 233 S.E.2d at 901.
89. 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1027, sec. 20 (currently N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
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Code section 58-54.4:
(11) Unfair Claim Settlement Practices - Committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice
of any of the following: Provided, however, that no violation of
this subsection shall of itself create a cause of action in favor of
any person other than the Commissioner."
The general effect of a proviso is to except something from the
enacting clause, qualify or restrain it, or exclude some possible
ground of misinterpretation of it. 1 Where a statute contains distinct subsections, an amendment to one of the subsections does not
apply to the other subsections because it is presumed that if the
legislature had intended the amendment to apply to the other subsections it would have expressed that intention.2 The language of
the proviso to section 58-54.4 of the Insurance Code indicates that
subsection eleven alone cannot be the basis of a private claim.
Therefore, this amendment expressly excepts a subsection eleven
violation from per se status. By placing the critical language in
subsection eleven rather than in the enacting clause of section 5854.4, all of section 58-54.4 except subsection eleven is defined by
exclusion as a per se violation of section 75-1.1.11
The legislature's amendment to subsection eleven implicitly
acknowledges the per se rule created by the Pearce decision. However, the amendment represents a direct response to the decision
as to only one of the thirteen regulatory violations defined in section 58-54.4. It negates the effect of the per se rule only in the
sensitive area of unfair claims settlement techniques. Although the
legislature expressly repudiated the effect of the rule concerning
this one particular subsection, it declined to either adopt or repudiate the rule concerning the other twelve subsections. The legislature could have enacted a provision mandating that a violation of
any regulation in section 58-54.4 constitutes an unfair act under
the UTPA, as it has done with similar provisions in other regula54.4(11) (Interim Supp. 1987)).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(11) (Interim Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Barnhill Sanitation Serv., Inc. v. Gaston County, 87 N.C. App.
532, 362 S.E.2d 161 (1987); Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
92. Arrington v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 264 N.C. 38, 140 S.E.2d
759 (1965).
93. See Arrington, 264 N.C. at 42, 140 S.E.2d at 762, for an example of the
application of the statutory rules discussed in notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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tory statutes, 4 but it conspicuously declined to do so. Perhaps the
same powerful lobbying efforts that successfully protected the insurance industry from the effect of a per se rule for unfair settlement techniques also persuaded the legislature to move slowly in
overtly approving a per se rule for other activities listed in section
58-54.4.
4.

Statutory Purposes

The public policy implications provide another strong argument against a per se rule. Pearce failed to consider the reason the
legislature defined the specified Insurance Code activities as regulatory violations. The Insurance Code's prohibition of unfair acts is
preventive in nature. The statute gives the Insurance Commissioner, as agent for the public, the power and duty to force a com95
pany to stop practices that may at some point injure the public.
The UTPA, however, is remedial in nature. This statute gives an
individual, in his private capacity, the right to a remedy from a
business whose practices actually injured the person."'
An activity proscribed by the Insurance Code regulations may
warrant injunctive action by the state but may not be sufficiently
culpable to constitute an unfair practice under section 75-1.1. For
instance, section 58-54.4(10) prohibits an insurer from advertising
in foreign states in which the insurer is not licensed.9 7 Although
this act is an unlawful violation of the regulatory statute, it does
not necessarily offend established public policy, nor is it necessarily immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers. 8 Whether a particular act, such as foreign
advertising, offends public policy or is substantially injurious to a
consumer is more appropriately determined based on the facts in a
particular case than by an inflexible legislative mandate.
5.

The Effect of Pearce

The decision in Pearce forces insurers to be particularly careful to comply with the regulations of section 58-54.4 of the Code.
94. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
95. See generally Phillips v. Integon Corp., 70 N.C. App. 440, 319 S.E.2d 673
(1984); State ex rel. Comm'r v. Integon Corp., 28 N.C. App. 7, 220 S.E.2d 409
(1975).
96. Morgan, supra note 40, at 19.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(10).
98. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
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Failure to comply can now subject insurers not only to a cease and
desist order or fine but also to a potential treble damage lawsuit as
well. The Pearce decision also forces attorneys to make some adjustments in the way they present their claims.
Section 58-54.4 contains two types of regulations, "objective"
and "subjective." ' I Even with a per se rule, insurers can defend
against both types of regulations. A consumer still must prove an
actual injury proximately caused by the insurer's unfair act. 10 0 For
the objective regulations, the insurer must focus its defense on the
injury and causation issues. For the subjective regulations, the insurer must concentrate on arguing such issues as deceit, inducement, misrepresentation, and falsity to the jury at trial rather than
to a judge on brief. These adjustments certainly will impact pleading and defense tactics for attorneys attempting to vindicate their
insurance clients.
B. Preempting The UTPA
Assume that the supreme court intended that an insurer who
violates the Insurance Code section 58-54.4 is subject to treble
damages in a civil suit based only on a showing that the consumer
was injured as a result of the violation. Did the court also intend
that an insurer who does not violate section 58-54.4 is not subject
to treble damages? In other words, does the Insurance Code preempt the UTPA in private litigation of unfair insurance acts? Although the question was not specifically before the court in Pearce,
the court could have resolved this issue in its otherwise sweeping
decision. The statutes' 01 and case law from North Carolina,'0 2 as
well as from other states'" that have confronted this issue, indicate that the controlling standard for private UTPA claims is
whether the actions were unfair or oppressive to the consumer in
that instance, not whether the actions are included in those listed
in the regulations of the Insurance Code.
1.
Code

Statutory Construction of the UTPA and the Insurance

Applying the traditional rules of statutory interpretation, a
99. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. Ellis, 48 N.C. App at 184, 268 S.E.2d at 273-74.
101. See infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 144-156 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 116-143 and accompanying text.
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later statute generally will not be deemed to repeal or modify an
earlier statute on the same subject. All existing statutes pertaining
to the same subject matter are construed so as to make each effective and to avoid undesirable consequences."" The UTPA and the
Insurance Code each prohibit unfair trade practices in the insurance industry. However, the purpose of each statute and the methods provided within each to effect its purpose are distinct. To give
effect to each according to the rules of construction above, the purpose of each and the consequences of the interpretation of each
must be considered.
The purpose of the UTPA is to enable injured individuals to
recover damages for injuries incurred from unethical business practices. 10 5 The purpose of the Insurance Code is to regulate insurance
to prevent potential injury to the public.' °6 The broad language of
the UTPA section 75-1.1 vests in the court the power to determine
whether an act is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or
substantially injurious to a consumer, depending on the facts in
the case.107 The Insurance Code vests in the Commissioner only
the power to determine whether an insurer violated the regulatory
statute, and not whether the purpose or effect of an insurer's actions is injurious to an individual consumer. 0 8 To allow a plaintiff
to recover only for the specific prohibitions listed in the Insurance
Code would not only give the Commissioner power beyond that
delegated to him in the Code, but would render the UTPA ineffective as a means of redress for insurance consumers.
Under the Insurance Code, the Commissioner issues cease and
desist orders or fines for violations of the regulations.1 0 9 The Commissioner, however, has no power to determine whether and to
what extent a consumer has been injured by a violation.1 10 Since
the purpose of the UTPA is to remedy and not restrain, and the
power vested in the court is broad and not limited, the legislature
104. See Little, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966).
105. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
106. Phillips, 70 N.C. App. 440, 319 S.E.2d 673 (1984). See generally State
ex rel. Comm'r v. Integon Corp., 28 N.C. App. 7, 220 S.E.2d 409 (1975) (Commissioner's power to act in regard to unfair trade practices is limited to investigating,
bringing charges, and ordering violator to cease and desist. Commissioner has
only the express and incidental powers given to him by the legislature).
107. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 262-63, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
108. Phillips, 70 N.C. App. at 444, 319 S.E.2d at 675.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.5 - 54.7 and 58-54.11.
110. Phillips, 70 N.C. App. at 444, 319 S.E.2d at 675.
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apparently did not intend that the specific activities defined in the
Insurance Code dictate an individual's right to relief under the
UTPA. The consequences of restricting the activities for which
consumers can recover would give insurers the ability to avoid the
UTPA through evasive defensive tactics while requiring buyers to
prove that the insurer's misconduct fits into one of the thirteen
listed activities.
The broad language of the UTPA indicates that its scope and
application are not limited to precise acts that can be readily catalogued. " The standard of unfairness for private injuries considers
public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter of the
law.112 When the General Assembly adopted the UTPA it refused
to adopt the section of the model act that listed activities considered to be unfair. " The legislature probably feared that including
a list would necessarily imply that relatively dissimilar practices
should be excluded. 1 4 Likewise, such a list created only for unfair
insurance practices is inappropriate. Specifically defining all
known unfair trade practices is futile because the inventiveness of
human nature renders the list obsolete at the outset.1 1 5 A definitive
list thus creates the potential for abuse, weakening the purpose
and effect of the UTPA to redress private injuries.
2.

Statutes From Other States

Furthermore, if the legislature intended that a plaintiff can recover under the UTPA only for the specific activities prohibited by
the Insurance Code, it would have included the list in the UTPA
or provided a private right of action under the Insurance Code as
other states have done. For example, the Arkansas UTPA includes
a section on unfair settlement practices virtually identical to North
Carolina's section 58-54.4(11).116 The Arkansas UTPA clearly
states that when alleging an unfair settlement practice, an individ111. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 262, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
112. Id. at 265, 266 S.E.2d at 622.
113. Note, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896 (1969-70).
114. Id.
115. H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d sess. 19 (1914) (one congressman
explaining why the federal legislation did not adopt a list of proscribed unfair

acts).
116. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-305(a) (1987). The Arkansas statute does not contain the language of the 1986 amendments to the North Carolina statute discussed supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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ual must prove the mandates of that section to recover under the
UTPA."' The Texas Insurance Code provides that an individual
can recover in a private right of action for a violation of the Insurance Code unfair trade practices section, a violation of the rules
and regulations of the Board of Insurance, or any practice proscribed by the UTPA." s The North Carolina statutes make no
such reference to each other in this manner.
States are continually deciding whether or not regulatory statutes preempt their UTPAs. Many courts decide the issue based on
whether the regulatory statute contains a remedy for consumers so
that it is complete within itself.11 9 In Chelsea Plaza Homes v.
Moore," the Kansas Supreme Court held that since the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act controls the rights and remedies for
landlords and tenants, it preempts all transactions within its purview. 1 ' A Missouri court in Dover v. Stanley122 held that even
though its Odometer Unlawful Practices Act is part of its consumer protection act, it contains its own private remedy and therefore the remedy preempts any treble damages award."23 The North
Carolina Insurance Code contains no such private remedy for unfair insurance practices. Therefore, following this line of reasoning,
it does not preempt the UTPA.
3. The Case Law
The most frequently litigated area of Insurance Code violations involves unfair trade practices in settling claims. Settlement
claims litigation is particularly troubling to consumers because
most state insurance code regulations require the Commissioner to
prove that the insurer performed the unfair settlement technique
with "such frequency to indicate a general business practice."""
117. See Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664
S.W.2d 463 (1984).
118. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.
1979).
119. See generally J. SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES
25 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
120. 226 Kan. 430, 601 P.2d 1100 (1979).
121. 601 P.2d at 1104.
122. 652 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. App. 1983).
123. Id.
124. Many states have adopted substantially the Model Act proposed by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners entitled "An Act Relating to
Unfair Methods of Competition in the Business of Insurance." See Houser, Un-
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On the issue of preemption, the rule in California 2 5 and Illinois 12 6
is that the Insurance Code does not preempt the UPTA, but Connecticut, 2 7 Montana,"' s New York,' 2 9 and West Virginia' 0 have
held that the Insurance Code prevails. The North Carolina courts,
while they have not addressed the preemption issue directly, have
assessed claims of unfair insurance practices solely on whether the
impact on the consumer was unfair or oppressive.' 3 ' These decisions indicate that North Carolina's Insurance Code does not preempt its UTPA. However, where a claim expressly rests on a violation of the Insurance Code, the courts have been strict in requiring
32
a plaintiff to prove the articulated activity.
The leading case against preemption is Royal Globe Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court.133 In Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court
held that its UTPA statute was not preempted by its Insurance
Code." California's Insurance Code, virtually identical to North
Carolina's subsection 58-54.4(11), requires that unfair settlement
practices be "performed with such frequency as to constitute a
general business practice."' 5 The plaintiff claimed only a single instance of unfair treatment.' The California court reasoned that,
while repetition of prohibited acts is relevant to the duty of the
Insurance Commissioner to halt the practice, the frequency of the
insurer's misconduct and its application to others is irrelevant to
fair Claims Settlement Practices Act, 15 THE FORUM 336, Schedule B at 347
(1979).
125. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. 3d 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842,
592 P.2d 329 (1979).
126. Fox v. Industrial Cas. Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 543, 54 Ill. Dec. 89, 424
N.E.2d 839 (1981) (an insured is not limited to filing an action against an insurer
based on violations of the Insurance Code).
127. Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986). But cf. Gibbs v.
Southeastern Investment Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Conn. 1987) (distinguishing insurance practices from mobile home regulatory statutes).
128. Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983).
129. Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 889, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589,
408 N.E.2d 918 (1980).
130. Jenkins v. J.C. Penny Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
131. See infra notes 144-156 and acompanying text.
132. Id.
133. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329 (1979). In California, a
third party may not bring suit until the insured and insurer have litigated the
unfair practice issue and the insured prevailed. Id.
134. Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 334.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 336.
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an injured private litigant seeking redress under the UTPA. 3's
Otherwise, if the Code provision preempts the UTPA, the first person mistreated by an insurance company cannot recover until the
mistreatment becomes so consistent as to become a general business practice."3 8 Since a person has the right to redress under the
UTPA for insurance claims, it would seem absurd to suggest that
the first few mistreated persons would have no cause of action in
the absence of evidence of a general business practice. 1 9 Therefore, preemption of the UTPA by the Insurance Code regulations
would seriously affect a consumer's ability to recover for an injury
resulting from only one instance of misconduct.
Connecticut's district and state courts disagree on the issue of
whether the Connecticut Insurance Code preempts its UTPA. The
district court in Doyle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co."" emphasized that a private cause of action was a means to redress a
wrong done to an individual and that proof of a general course of
conduct would go beyond the wrong done to an individual." 1 But
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Mead v. Burns"4 2 deferred to
the legislative judgment that an isolated instance of unfair settlement practices was "not so violative of public policy as to warrant
statutory intervention." 143 However, the Mead court failed to consider that the statutory intervention for a general course of conduct is the function of the Commissioner and not a private individual. More importantly, if the Insurance Code preempts the UTPA,
an insurer may proceed with the misconduct without fear of reprisal as long as the misconduct is carefully scheduled at irregular
intervals.
4. Recent North Carolina Decisions
In North Carolina, the courts have dealt with the issue of preemption only indirectly. The litigation of unfair insurance acts has
resulted in dismissals for both pleading and proof deficiencies. As
the following cases show, if the plaintiff cannot show that the in137. Id.
138. Klaudt, 658 P.2d at 1070 (Weber, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. 583 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1984).
141. Id.
142. 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986).
143. Mead, 509 A.2d at 19. However, in a footnote, the court indicated that
the claim might survive in a common law action for unfair trade practices. Id. at
19 n.8.
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surer violated a Code section, he must plead his claim in such a
manner that the court will review the claim under the standard of
the UTPA. Of course, if the plaintiff can show a Code violation,
the plaintiff will now have the benefit of the Pearce per se rule,
with the exception of unfair claim settlement practices. 44
Smith v. King1 45 and Beasley v. National Savings Life Ins.
Co. 146 were decided before Pearce. In both cases, the plaintiffs al-

leged that the insurer committed an unfair practice in violation of
the UTPA and section 58-54.4(11) of the Insurance Code. The appellate court adhered to the strict requirements of the Code section, dismissing Smith for failing to prove more than a single instance of unfair claim settlement147 and Beasley for failing to plead
more than one such instance. " 8 The supreme court initially agreed
to review Beasley, but withdrew, leaving the issue of preemption
still undecided. 4 9 These cases illustrate the potential damage to
consumers should the Insurance Code ultimately be held to preempt the UTPA.
Since Pearce, the court of appeals appears willing to consider
an unfair insurance practice claim based on the UTPA standard of
unfairness, provided the action is properly pled. In Marshburn v.
Associated Indemnity Corp.,' the plaintiff brought suit alleging
that the insurer's settlement techniques were unfair trade practices
in violation of the UTPA section 75-1.1 or, alternatively, that the
insurer's practices violated the Insurance Code section 58-54.4 together with section 75-1.1.'1' Reviewing the first claim under section 75-1.1 together with section 58-54.4, the court held that failure to allege more than a single instance of unfair settlement
practices was fatal to a cause of action under section 58-54.4.' 51 Yet
the court held that plaintiff's second claim under section 75-1.1
alone failed because the acts were not unethical, oppressive, or de144. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
145. 52 N.C. App. 158, 277 S.E.2d 875 (1981).
146. 75 N.C. App. 104, 330 S.E.2d 207 (1985).
147. 52 N.C. App. at 161, 277 S.E.2d at 876-77.
148. 75 N.C. App. at 109, 330 S.E.2d at 210.
149. Beasley, 75 N.C. App. 104, 330 S.E.2d 207, disc. rev. improvidently
granted, 316 N.C. 372, 341 S.E.2d 338 (1986).
150. 84 N.C. App. 365, 353 S.E.2d 123 (1987).

151. Opening Brief for Appellent at 9, Marshburn v. Associated Indemnity
Corp., 84 N.C. App. 365, 353 S.E.2d 123 (1987) (No. 864SC243).
152. 84 N.C. App. at 374, 353 S.E.2d at 129.
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ceptive in any way. 153 Marshburn then stands for the proposition
that the court will use the broad unfairness standard of the UTPA
for a section 75-1.1 claim for insurance practices but will adhere to
the strict letter of the Code if the Code is pled.
In a later case, Dull v. Mutual of Omaha, 54 the unfair insurance practice was pled in alternative claims as in Marshburn. The
appeals court reviewed at length the case law pertaining to the
scope, standard, and determination of unfair trade practices in the
insurance industry. In its analysis of the section 75-1.1 claim the
court stated in part:
i. The UTPA section 75-1.1 is sufficiently broad to cover unfair
practices in the insurance industry.
ii. A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as
well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.
iii. The determination of whether specific conduct amounts to an
unfair or deceptive practice 1 in
violation of section 75-1.1 is a
55
question of law for the court.
The fact that the Dull court examined the section 75-1.1 claim so
thoroughly signals that a litigant can prevail in a claim against an
insurance company solely on a violation of the UTPA section 751.1.156
The Pearce decision created a per se rule for violations of the
Insurance Code section 58-54.4 but did not settle the issue of
whether the section preempts the UTPA. The per se rule offers a
new avenue of recovery for injured consumers. Furthermore, decisions of the court of appeals after Pearce indicate that an alternative exists if a consumer is unable to plead and prove a section 5854.4 violation. To overcome pleading and proof deficiencies in
claiming unfair insurance practices, attorneys should base their clients' claims on a Code violation only if they can prove the violation with absolute certainty. Otherwise, an attorney should rest the
claim on the UTPA section 75-1.1 alone, which requires only that
the insurer's actions violate the broad section 75-1.1 standard and
that the violation injure the plaintiff.
153.
610).
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 375, 353 S.E.2d at 129 (citing Johnson, 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d

85 N.C. App. 310, 354 S.E.2d 752 (1987).
Id. at 315-16, 354 S.E.2d at 755-56.
Id. (The court examined separately plaintiff's claim that defendant's actions were misleading in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(2).)
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CONCLUSION

The result of the Pearce decision is that a violation of the Insurance Code section 58-54.4 is a per se violation of the UTPA
section 75-1.1. Marshburn is but one case that clearly shows that
an unfair trade practice action can be litigated independent of a
Code violation. This Note has examined the appropriateness of the
per se rule and the pleading implications of the decision. The distinction between Code violations and UTPA infringements is important because each serves a purpose and, although their purposes overlap, they are not synonymous. For example, treble
damages are punitive in nature and are not necessarily suitable to
every regulatory violation. In addition, future changes in the insurance regulations may be needed to encourage or discourage industry practices for economic or social purposes. The legislature
should be able to adapt the Insurance Code regulations without
having to decide if each change constitutes an unfair trade practice
warranting treble damages. Until the supreme court or the legislature addresses the issues discussed throughout this Note, these
problems will remain unresolved and will create confusion for all of
the parties involved in these actions.
Cindy C. Heenan
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